Is There a Future for Digital Rights Management? by Tivadar, Krisztian
2011] K. Tivadar: Is There a Future for Digital Rights Management? 119
IS THERE A FUTURE FOR DIGITAL RIGHTS 
MANAGEMENT?
by
KRISZTIAN TIVADAR*
Although Digital Rights Management (hereinafter: „DRM”) does not have a legal  
definition in Hungarian law, it is undoubtedly part of the complex regulating sys-
tem including not only legal, but also business, political  and cultural  elements.  
DRM seems to impose restrictions on the users of copyright works well exceeding  
those provided by „traditional” copyright law. 
There has been surprisingly little debate in Hungary regarding the manner and  
extent of implementing the relevant international and European provisions. It still  
seems to be an open question whether DRM is a solution to the underlying issues  
and whether or not the advantages of DRM (for its beneficiaries) outweighs the  
hindrances caused to the users and to the original aim of copyright.
At the same time, the world (of Intellectual Property) is flooded by the argu-
ments for and against DRM. The various stakeholders wish to be heard and fiercely  
battle each other. Much can be learned from them in order to fine-tune the local sys-
tem.
This paper attempts to give an overview of the Hungarian legal provisions re-
garding DRM and their environment. It also wishes to show the advantages and  
disadvantages of the DRM-system based on the arguments of various parties. Fur-
thermore, it looks at the current alternatives offered beside DRM, as well as the po-
tential directions of development.
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1. DRM IS NOT A SOLE REGULATOR
DRM, as a technical measure, is just one element of a complex regulating 
system,  the  so-called  “trusted  system”1.  This  system also  includes  legal, 
business,  political  and cultural  elements.  Clearly, the business  interest of 
corporate right-holders (e.g. the media-industry) is to maintain the profitab-
ility of their investment in creating copyright works also in the digital era. It 
is the politicians’ right and duty to determine the cultural policy, which also 
includes a balancing act between the public good (e.g. the freedom of ex-
pression) and the monopoly provided to copyright holders2. Further, it is 
not disputable that the computer and the Internet are essential instruments 
of participation in culture3.
This trusted system constitutes a sociotechnical ensemble that achieves 
the aimed effects through the joint impact of its elements. If any of these ele-
ments falls out, the whole system loses its effectiveness. Gillespie calls this a 
„regime of alignment”4. According to him, the law does not create this re-
gime, but rather it is a means of achieving certain political, social and busi-
ness goals. 
Apparently, these general statements are valid also in respect of Hun-
gary. The legal protection of DRM was introduced by the Hungarian Copy-
right Act5 already at its adoption, and has been amended having an effect 
from Hungary’s accession into the EU6. The author is not aware of any pub-
lic consultation prior to the introduction or to the amendment of the Hun-
garian Copyright Act and, in particular, whether the users were asked.
Clearly, the relevant Hungarian legal regulation was introduced in ac-
cordance with Hungary’s international undertakings7 (Articles 11 and 12 of 
the WIPO Copyright  Treaty8)  and European Community obligations (the 
1 Gillespie, T. 2007, Wired shut: copyright and the shape of digital culture, MIT Press; p. 8
2 Gillespie, op. cit.; p 27
3 Gillespie, op. cit.; p. 10
4 Gillespie, op. cit.; p. 100
5 Act LXXVI of 1999 on copyright protection („Hungarian Copyright Act”)
6 Section 106 (1) of Act CII of 2003 on the amendment of some acts on industrial property and 
copyright. The accession date was 1 May 2004.
7 Samuelson, P. 1999, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circum-
vention Regulations Need to Be Revised, (14) Berkeley Technology Law Journal; p. 519 (also 
at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/law/easls/papers/Samuelson%20-%20Revising%20Anti-Cir-
cumvention.pdf): Samuelson argues that the WIPO Copyright Treaty adopted only a gener-
al norm on circumvention, allowing the member states to implement it in their own way.  
Based on this, no obligations seem to arose from the treaty for Hungary to formulate its an-
ti-circumvention provisions in the manner it did.
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implementation of the InfoSoc Directive9). However, noone seems to have 
debated about why Hungary undertook these obligations in the first place. 
Irrespectively of the reasons, the result is that the Hungarian legal regime 
regarding DRM fits perfectly into the international and the European sys-
tem. 
2. DRM UNDER HUNGARIAN LAW
Similarly to the InfoSoc Directive, the Hungarian Copyright Act provides 
for no single definition of DRM. Instead, the protection provided to DRM 
devices is based on the function of the device10. While Section 95 of the Hun-
garian  Copyright  Act  protects  effective  technological  measures  (“ETMs”; 
e.g.: encryption standards)11, Section 96 protects rights management inform-
ation (“RMI”; e.g.: Rights Expression Languages)12. The regulation of ETMs 
and RMI differs in so far as the protection of ETMs is independent from the 
infringer’s  knowledge of  copyright  infringement,  while  the protection of 
RMI is  connected with  it.  Further,  the  protection of ETMs includes  “an-
ti-device”  and “anti-service”  provisions,  declaring  that  the  trafficking  in 
devices and provision of services having as the main purpose of enabling or 
facilitating the circumvention is illegal.13 
Unsurprisingly, the Hungarian Copyright Act prohibits the circumven-
tion  of  DRM  in  accordance  with  the  InfoSoc  Directive.  The  Hungarian 
Copyright  Act  complies  with  the  “appropriate  legal  protection”  require-
ment of the InfoSoc Directive14 by declaring that the consequences of copy-
right infringement shall be applied in case of the circumvention of DRM 
measures15. 
8 Adopted in Geneva on 20 December 1996 and entered into force in respect of Hungary on 6 
March 2002
9 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the  
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society 
(„InfoSoc Directive”)
10 See Mazziotti, G. 2008, EU digital copyright law and the end-user, Springer p.180 as to lack 
of single definition in the InfoSoc Directive,
11 See also Article 6(3) of the InfoSoc Directive
12 See also Article 7(2) of the InfoSoc Directive
13 References to DRM herein include both ETMs and RMI.
14 Articles 6 (1) and 7 (1) of the InfoSoc Directive
15 Sections 95 (1) and 96 (1) of the Hungarian Copyright Act
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3. DRM VERSUS “TRADITIONAL” COPYRIGHT LAW
Both the legal protection of DRM and traditional copyright protection are 
based on the presumption that copyright and business incentive are neces-
sary for creativity, even though this presumption has been debated16.  Con-
sidering the common grounds with copyright, what novelties did DRM and 
its legal protection introduce?
Some17 reckon that DRM is one of the solutions to the challenges to copy-
right posed by the digital age. They argue that new possibilities arose to in-
fringe one’s copyright in the digital world that render collective rights man-
agement insufficient. Consequently, they are of the view that DRM fulfills a 
need for protection. 
Notwithstanding this, it is hereby submitted that DRM came to existence 
due to an opportunity to protect copyright works in a digital manner18. The 
rightholders have always committed everything to protect their copyrights 
as much as they could. One may assume that the rightholders would have 
used DRM also earlier, in the analogue era, if they had had the opportunity 
to do so. They did not use DRM because they did not have the relevant 
technical  means.  In  this  sense,  DRM  is  an  electronic  fence  around  the 
garden of copyright. 
Further, while copyright law provides for a pure legal protection, DRM 
includes both a technological control and, on a legal level, an anti-circum-
vention regulation. 
In contrast with copyright law’s ex post protection, DRM provides for an 
ex ante regulation19.  This means that DRM-measures foreclose any illegal 
use of the protected copyright work, while a judge has the opportunity to 
16 Gibson, J. 2007, Open Access, Open Source and Free Software: Is There a Copy Left?, in Mc-
Millan F. New directions in copyright law: vol. 4., Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., p. 127.  
Gibson argues that the western idea of genuine author and the paradigm of copyright being 
the motor of creativity are used to turn the collaborative development of innovation into the 
creative accountability of individuals. In respect of software, this transformation may be 
achieved by naming corporate identities as creators through branding. As a result of such 
„individual” efforts,  software becomes „valuable” and, therefore, marketable.  She claims 
that open source and free software reveal that the corporate models of creativity in respect 
of software development are artificially construed. She seems to state that the idea of indi-
vidual copyright is based on an economic model while the essence of open source and free 
software communities is to develop knowledge for the community, under community gov-
ernance.
17 Cserba,  V.  and Munkácsi,  P.  2008,  Lehetőség az  Önszabályozásra?  A DRM-megoldások 
hatása a nemzetközi  szerzői jogi  közös jogkezelés  gyakorlatára.  in  ed.  Penyigey,  K. and 
Kiss, M. Fehér könyv a szellemi tulajdon védelméről 2007. Hungarian Patent Office, p 155.
18 MacQueen, H. L. 2009.’Appropriate for the Digital Age’? Copyright and the Internet: 2. Ex-
ceptions and Licensing.  in ed. Lilian Edwards, Charlotte Waelde:  Law and the Internet,  
Hart Publishing, p 203
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consider the illegal nature of use under copyright law only after the actual 
use, if the rightholder turns to the court at all.
Furthermore, some are of the view that DRM may replace collective ad-
ministration of rights, as a traditional copyright management tool, in the di-
gital age. This is because the co-existence of the collective administration of 
rights  and DRM may force  users  to  pay  royalties  for  the  same  content 
twice20. According to a document prepared by the BBC21, „there are indica-
tions that implementation of DRM may also usher in a move from collective 
to individual administration of rights” and, in order to avoid this, the BBC 
suggested key principles to the implementation of DRM. This change seems 
less threatening to Cserba and Munkácsi22 who observed that DRM may re-
place  the collective  administration  of rights  if  (i)  all  works are provided 
with DRM; (ii) the permeability among the various technical solutions is en-
sured; and (iii) end users can acquire these works at a price not exceeding 
that of the royalty to be paid for the work’s use23. They also envisaged that 
collective societies may include DRM services into their fields of activity. 
4. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE DRM-
SYSTEM
4. 1 ADVANTAGES
DRM has advantages both for the rightholder and the user. Through using 
DRM, the rightholder may retain influence over the work even after mar-
keting it, because it is easy to bar any illegal use24. Further, the rightholder 
can control the use of the work by determining the territory, duration, scope 
and extent of use. Furthermore, the rightholder may develop various con-
19 Mazziotti, op. cit.; p. 181. Notwithstanding this, Mazziotti notes that the InfoSoc Directive 
blurs the common law (open ended list of exceptions, ex post assessment) and the contin-
ental droit d’auteur (strict, ex ante list of exceptions) by introducing a three step test in Art-
icle 5 (5) and, at the same time, providing for a strict, ex ante list of exceptions in Article 5 
(1)-(4). This is also true of the Hungarian Copyright Act (Chapter 4).
20 As part of the price of the blank carrier or medium (e.g. photocopier, CD) and for the con-
tent protected by DRM. This is not true if no blank media levy is to be paid (e.g. computers  
in Hungary).
21 BBC Submission on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee – “The management of copy-
right and related rights in the internal market” (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copy-
right/docs/management/consultation-rights-management/bbc_en.pdf).
22 Cserba, V. and Munkácsi, P., op. cit.
23 It is assumed that „royalty” here means the royalty to be paid to the collective society.
24 Cserba, V. and Munkácsi, P., op. cit.
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tract terms for various users. DRM also helps the rightholder to reduce the 
transaction cost of content distribution and increases the cost of illegal use25.
These advantages allow the rightholder to make business in a more flex-
ible manner, adjusting the terms of use and the prices to the laws in the 
various countries, as well as to any individual need of the users. Thereby, 
the rightholder may avoid any illegal use. If someone illegally breaks the 
DRM code, the rightholder may still turn to the anti-circumvention provi-
sions referred to above.
Theoretically, it is a development for both the rightholders and the users 
that it is easier to conclude and fulfill license contracts due to the digital en-
vironment and the opportunity to communicate swiftly. DRM also allows 
for new forms of marketing and business models (e.g. pay-per-download 
services, online lending, interactive TV services)26. 
The question remains whether or not the rightholders wish to negotiate 
the various contract terms with individual users and, if not, what negotiat-
ing power the users have regarding these terms.
4.2 DISADVANTAGES
Notwithstanding the above, it seems that the disadvantages caused to the 
legitimate users of DRM works might outweigh the above-specified advant-
ages.
DRM systems do not respect  the traditional  copyright exceptions and 
limitations27. DRM limits or excludes the possibility to fair use (e.g. private 
copying). According to Tian, the prerequisite of free use is legal access28. He 
refers to the Universal City Studios v Corley case in the USA29 in which the 
court held that the circumvented DRM device provided access control, and 
not copy control. He claims that the implication of the decision is that free 
use cannot be applied without “free access”.  Further, if  a legitimate user 
may access a work by circumventing a DRM device, this is not possible in 
practice, unless the user has sufficient knowledge to break the encryption 
25 Barczewski,  M.  2007,  The  consequences  of  DRM  for  information  access  and  copyright, 
Medien und Recht International, 1817-8456. issue 3. Supplement, p. XI.
26 Cserba, V. and Munkácsi, P., op. cit.
27 Barczewski, op. cit.
28 Tian, Y. 2009, Re-thinking intellectual property : the political economy of copyright protec-
tion in the digital era, Routledge p. 230
29 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir.  2001) – a Norwegian teenager broke the CSS code used on DVDs (by 
using DeCSS program) and Corley published this program on the website of his newspa-
per.
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code.  This  is  because  the  anti-circumvention  laws  forbid  trafficking  in 
devices capable of circumventing DRM devices.30
Thanks  to  DRM,  the  transformative  uses  of  copyright  works  become 
subject to licensing31. This is because the user needs the rightholder’s con-
sent to use the DRM protected work, even if the use is legitimate and serves 
productive, and not mere entertainment purposes. Assuming that private 
copying stimulates the production of new works (inspiration in both private 
study and scientific research), it is unambiguous that DRM restricts or pree-
mpts the creation of such works. DRM may constitute a bar to creative free 
use, even though traditional copyright law would allow for this.
The narrow exceptions provided by anti-circumvention regulation result 
in  an  overbroad protection  not  sought  by  traditional  copyright  law.  As 
already mentioned above, the circumvention of DRM is a per se tort. As a 
consequence of this,  users are barred not only from the use of copyright 
works, but also from the use of non-copyrightable material (e.g.: facts, data, 
information, functionalities). Further, DRM protects works even if the copy-
right protection has expired32. Preposterously, even copyright holders may 
breach DRM regulations, if they circumvent the code in order to ascertain 
that their rights have been infringed33.
Tian refers to anti-circumvention regulation as “para-copyright” because 
these are independent from traditional copyright34. He argues that, in the 
United States, this separation allowed also for actors outside the copyright 
industry to claim DRM-breach (e.g. in connection with a garage-door open-
er software). According to him, this carries within the danger of abuse of 
anti-circumvention  provisions  and may  even be  contrary  to  competition 
law. It is hereby submitted that copyright and anti-circumvention regula-
tion do not apply to the copyright industry, but rather to copyright works. 
30 Mazziotti, op. cit.; p. 201. Mazziotti refers to the French Mulholland Drive case (the plaintiff  
could not copy a film for private use from DVD to VHS due to the DRM device used on the  
DVD), where the Paris Court of Appeal held that there is no subjective right to make a  
private copy of a protected work, but rather the private copying exception is a mere defense 
against  infringement  claims.  However,  the  court  established that this  exception prevails 
over the DRM measure applied by the rightholder in order to protect his copyright. The  
French Supreme Court overturned this decision in its own. Mazziotti argued that the latter  
court’s  decision  was  unclear.  This  case  became  less  relevant  because  French  law  has 
changed afterwards. Private copying was defined as an enforceable use against technical 
devices.
31 Mazziotti, op. cit.; p. 217
32 MacQueen, op. cit.
33 Tian, Y., op. cit.; p 232
34 Tian, Y., op. cit.; p 234
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Therefore, the abuse of DRM should be evaluated irrespective of the in-
dustry. Nevertheless,  it  would be clearly abusive,  if  the rightholder used 
DRM in order to maintain its monopoly for information other than copy-
right works.
Mazziotti observed that the possible lack of interoperability between two 
DRM-systems may result in the user not being able to use a DRM-protected 
work on a medium using another DRM system – despite acquiring both 
lawfully35.  There  is  no  single  standard for  DRM. However,  according  to 
him, it is crucial to avoid that any of the market stakeholders forces upon 
the others the use of its DRM system, thereby creating a de facto standard36. 
The Commission of the European Communities also held the interoperabil-
ity of DRM systems of major importance for the internal market37. The Com-
mission set up the aims that a global and interoperable DRM infrastructure 
be established through the supporting of open standards of communication 
and  encoding  simultaneously  with  the  enforcement  of  copyright  excep-
tions38. 
A further argument against DRM is that it might rob judges of their ex 
post freedom to evaluate and opportunity to decide. As the circumvention 
of DRM measures is a per se tort, judges may not be in a position to con-
sider whether or not the user breached copyright, but rather they may have 
to automatically establish that the anti-circumvention provisions have been 
breached. Therefore, the rightholders, as private actors, can determine the 
actual scope of the users’ use rights prior to the use of the work39. 
The use of DRM allows for  the monitoring of the user's  conduct  and 
habits. However, this may injure the user’s right to privacy. In connection 
with this, Mazziotti refers to Lessig and claims that DRM does not automat-
ically cause the injury of the right to privacy, only if the user’s identity and 
habits cannot be hidden from the rightholders40. Consequently, the protec-
tion of privacy greatly depends on the set-up and the management of the 
DRM system. Unless the legislators require the providers of DRM techno-
35 Mazziotti, op. cit.; p. 189
36 Mazziotti, op. cit.; p. 187
37 Communication from the Commission to the Council,  the European Parliament and the 
European Economic  and Social  Committee,  The Management  of  Copyright  and Related 
Rights in the Internal Market, COM/2004/0261 final, §1.2.5 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUr-
iServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52004DC0261:EN:NOT)
38 The author is not aware of any European level legislation in connection with these aims.
39 Mazziotti, op. cit.; p. 181
40 Mazziotti, op. cit.; p. 34.
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logy to create their devices in a manner that protects privacy, this threat re-
mains.
5. POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS, SUGGESTIONS
Theoretically, one may envisage the future of DRM on a wide scale from 
total DRM-control to a pirates’ paradise, where DRM measures have no dis-
suasive power whatsoever. However, it is more likely that such “end of his-
tory for IP” will  not come to existence. There are various suggestions for 
solving the issues raised by DRM and specified above. However, none of 
these offers a perfect solution. 
5.1 SUGGESTION REGARDING THE DURATION OF DRM 
PROTECTION
As to the duration of DRM protection, MacQueen suggests that laws should 
prescribe that DRM control shall cease upon the expiry of the subsisting 
copyright41. Nevertheless, the expiry date may be hardly specified in case of 
authors who are still alive. 
5.2 SUGGESTION FOR PROTECTION OF PRIVACY
In order to deal with the potential threat that DRM causes to privacy, the 
law should forbid DRM protection that extends to monitoring personal con-
duct. 42
5.3 SUGGESTIONS REGARDING THE EXTENT OF DRM-
CONTROL
There are numerous suggestions concerned with the extent of DRM-control. 
One of these is to connect the protection of ETMs to copyright infringement 
(similarly to the protection of RMIs). However, it is not clear how DRM sys-
tems could distinguish based on user’s intent (e.g. based on user’s own de-
claration)43. Further, DRM technology may be useful only for the purpose of 
accommodating the simplest transformative uses (e.g. quotation),  but not 
more complex uses (e.g. parody)44. 
41 MacQueen, op. cit.
42 Mazziotti,  op. cit.; p. 34. Mazziotti concludes that the InfoSoc Directive is not capable of  
achieving this.
43 MacQueen, op. cit.
44 Mazziotti, op. cit.; p. 217
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Samuelson suggested that all legitimate purposes should be exempted 
from the anti-circumvention provisions45. 
Similarly,  Tian  put  forward  that  the  scope  of  exceptions  should  be 
broadened based on the so-called fair circumvention doctrine46. According 
to this doctrine, users should be allowed to circumvent the technical meas-
ures serving not only rights control but also access control aims. In connec-
tion with this, the manufacturing and marketing of devices used for circum-
vention should be also exempted in order to involve also those users who 
do not have the necessary technical skills47. These exemptions should only 
be applied if certain requirements were met (e.g. the copyright holder does 
not publish how the users can use the DRM protected content without addi-
tional costs and effort). 
Tian also proposed that the rights of rightholders and users should be 
balanced through the following means.48. First, judges should be provided 
with a right to deliberate as to the righteousness of the applied DRM system 
in light of copyright and its limitations and exceptions. Secondly, specific  
legal mechanisms should be used to enforce such right. For example, inde-
pendent bodies should be established that (i) control the technical measures; 
(ii)  assist  users in exercising their fair circumvention right; (iii)  avoid any 
abuses of the fair circumvention exception by users; and (iv) assists courts 
in issues regarding technical  measures. Thirdly, the involvement of users 
and the working of market  mechanisms should be strengthened.  For ex-
ample, rightholders should be obliged to display on their products if they 
applied any DRM system. This would allow users to chose between similar 
products  based on whether or  not  DRM is  applied  or  to  chose  between 
products offered under different DRM terms.
However, these proposals seem to render DRM protection superfluous, 
because the infringers could acquire information and devices to break en-
cryption codes from the market. The only difference to traditional copyright 
protection  would,  therefore,  be  that  infringers  would  also  be  liable  for 
breaching the anti-circumvention provisions. This way, DRM would not en-
sure a stronger protection or easier enforceability to traditional copyright 
45 Samuelson, op. cit.
46 Tian, Y., op. cit.; p 238
47 Tian, Y., op. cit.; p 243
48 Tian, Y., op. cit.; p 241
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law. It is neither clear how the independence of the “independent bodies” 
could be ensured.
According to Cohen49,  users should have a right of self-help based on 
which they may lawfully circumvent DRM protection as far as it restricts 
fair use. This is based on the US Constitution’s intellectual property clause 
that specifies an originality requirement in respect of copyright and on the 
US Constitution’s First Amendment that establishes a right to free speech. 
According to Cohen, the contractual terms contrary to the US Constitution 
and DRM systems that implement such contracts should be invalid. Con-
sequently, users may always claim that they legally circumvented a DRM 
measure if the measure was over-restrictive.50
Nevertheless, Cohen’s argumentation may only be applied in countries 
where the constitution recognises the limited nature of copyright protection. 
For  example,  there  is  no  such  requirement  at  the  constitutional  level  in 
Hungary; and the parties to an agreement may generally contract out of the 
Hungarian Copyright Act.
Mazziotti considers, as an optional solution, the provision of a narrow 
exception from anti-circumvention51. He suggests that distinction should be 
made  between  productive  (e.g.  scientific  works)  and  unproductive  uses 
(mere entertainment) of copyright works. He suggests the creation of an in-
dependent, external decision maker (e.g. a public agency) to ascertain the 
identity of the user and the purpose of the request. Further, this authority 
would provide the user (in person or electronically) with a personal crypto-
graphic key or code in order to enable access to a technically unrestricted 
copy of the requested works. 
The weakness of this solution seems to be that the introduction of the 
third party authority slows down the process of acquiring the work. If the 
user sought to exercise his free use right in respect of more DRM protected 
works, the delay may be multiplied. This method would, therefore, not dis-
solve the chilling effect of DRM on transformative uses. Further, the inde-
pendence and trustworthiness of the independent third party would be a 
prerequisite of a working system. 
49 Cohen, J. E. 1998, „Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, (24) Berkeley Technology 
Law  Journal,  p.  1089,  also  at  http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/property00/alternatives/self-
help.html.
50 See also Mazziotti, op. cit.; 220.
51 Mazziotti, op. cit.; p. 224.
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Theoretically, it would be possible, to use alternative compensation sys-
tems, where the payment would be paid as a part of, for example, the Inter-
net subscription fee, price of software and/or hardware, tax or blank media 
levy52. This would mean a return to collective administration of rights53
However, it would be hard in this case to (i) follow the downloading of 
works without monitoring users’ conduct and, thereby breaching the users’ 
right to privacy; (ii) ascertain rate of royalties; (iii) ensure that the righthold-
ers receive a proper percentage of the collected royalties; and to (iv) distin-
guish users who do not download copyright works.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Although DRM protection may have advantages for both rightholders and 
for  users,  it  has the potential  of disabling the limitations and exceptions 
available  in  traditional  copyright  law and exceptions of traditional  copy-
right  law,  in  particular  of  trespassing  on traditionally  legitimate  private 
uses. Anti-circumvention laws were created because DRM codes proved to 
be  ineffective  once  they  have  been  decrypted.  These  laws  protect  DRM 
measures irrespectively of the underlying copyright, if any. Therefore, anti-
circumvention provisions are not legitimised by the need to protect copy-
right.
It is submitted that anti-circumvention laws are not adding to traditional 
copyright law protection. The author is not aware of any reasons why addi-
tional legal protection should be provided to DRM measures, where these 
are broader than traditional copyright law would allow for. Nor, in the au-
thor's opinion, is additional legal protection necessary where DRM protec-
tion and traditional copyright law overlap with each other. 
Notwithstanding the above, it seems that there is no perfect solution for 
the synchronising of DRM control with the exercising of copyright excep-
tions, such as private copying or even transformative uses, and information 
not protected by copyright. The proposed solutions often do not allow for 
unrestricted legitimate private use of copyright works and information not 
protected by copyright. Alternatively, the solutions render the DRM protec-
tion complex but easily circumventable and, therefore, superfluous. None of 
these proposals considered that it could lead to society declining the whole 
52 Cserba, V. and Munkácsi, P., op. cit.
53 E.g. „Ernesto”: Dutch Artist Unions Call Government to Legalize File-Sharing (http://tor-
rentfreak.com/dutch-artist-unions-call-government-to-legalize-file-sharing-101124/).
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system if it is harder to respect the law than to break it. If it generally takes  
legitimate users more time and effort to exercise their free use right than to 
find grey market alternatives, users will not be incentivised to obey the trus-
ted system.
In view of the above, one may argue that there is no need for DRM at all  
and that, therefore, legislators should remove the anti-circumvention provi-
sions (e.g. from the Hungarian Copyright Act). However, the business in-
terest of corporate copyright holders is to protect their valuables in every 
possible way. The legislators seem to support this crusade or, at least, they 
do not seem to be eager to restrain DRM to the scope of traditional copy-
right law. 
Consequently, DRM might remain a long-lasting element of the trusted 
system and of the struggle to safeguard power and profit from the pirates 
(all users?) of the digital age. One can only hope that the DRM paradox will 
be solved through the introduction of new business models that fit the new 
economy better.
